NYLS Journal of Human Rights
Volume 9

Issue 1

Article 9

1991

ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
Paul R. Joseph

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joseph, Paul R. (1991) "ON READING THE CONSTITUTION," NYLS Journal of Human Rights: Vol. 9 : Iss. 1 ,
Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights/vol9/iss1/9

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NYLS Journal of Human Rights by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

BOOK REVIEW
ON READING THE CONSTITUTION. By Laurence H. Tribe and

Michael C. Dorf. Cambridge, MA/London:
University Press, 1991. Pp. 144. $18.95.

Harvard

Reviewed by Paul R Joseph"
As this is being written, the opposing sides of the Senate are
gearing up for the struggle over Judge Clarence Thomas.1 To some,
the nomination is seen as a disaster and to others as an affirmation.
The national debate about the fitness of the nominee to sit on the
Supreme Court is likely to be anguished and acrimonious.
Why do people care who sits on the Court? If a nominee
were so lacking in intellectual ability that s/he could not read or
understand the Constitution, or if the nominee were such an evil
person that s/he would consciously vote in a way which s/he knew
intellectually was wrong, the concern would be understandable.
Leaving aside gross stupidity or an evil nature, perhaps the
Constitution admits of but one answer to each question before the
Court, and a particular ideology must be employed to discover it.2
*Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova University; B.A., Goddard
College, 1973; J.D., Unversity of California, Davis, 1977; LL.M., Temple University
Law Center, 1979.
' Judge Thomas of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, was nominated by President George Bush on July 1, 1991, to replace
Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall, Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Bush
Picks Wild Card, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,1991, at Al, who announced his retirement from
the Supreme Court on June 27, 1991. Marshall Retires from High Court; Blow to
Liberals, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1991, at Al. This book review was written prior to
Professor Anita Hill's allegations of sexual harassment against Judge Thomas, and
refers only to the debate regarding his views on constitutional interpretation. On
October 15, 1991, Clarence Thomas was confirmed by the United States Senate,
R.W. Apple, Jr., The Thomas Confirmation:Senate Confirms Thomas, 52-48, Ending Week
of Bitter Battle; 'Time for Healing,' Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES, October 16, 1991, at Al,
and on October 18, 1991 was sworn in as Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court. Maureen Dowd, The Thomas Swearing-In; a Festive Mood at Thomas
Swearing-In, N.Y. TIMES, October 19, 1991, § 1, at 8.
2 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights,
23 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 823 (1986); Edwin Meese III, Construing the Constitution, 19
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 22 (1985); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.
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If so, only a person with that ideology should sit on the Court. But
if this were true then any Justice, unless stupid or evil, would apply
the 'correct' ideology. So, barring those
extremes, it would not really
3
all.
after
Court
the
on
sat
matter who
Perhaps the Constitution is so vague and indeterminate that
it will support an unlimited number of answers to any constitutional
question with no principled way to choose between them. This
would mean that the Constitution is irrelevant to constitutional
interpretation and that the Justices do nothing more than apply their
own personal views when deciding cases. This would explain why
we care who sits on the Court but it would not explain why we have
a Supreme Court at all. Under this view, adjudication becomes a
purely political (and cynical) exercise of power.4
Each of the extreme views has adherents. Yet, if a single
ideological perspective assured infallible constitutional decision
making, one would expect the Constitution to make this clear. If the
Constitution is irrelevant to constitutional interpretation and judging
is merely personal whims writ large, it is hard to see why the
Constitution exists or why it should provide for a Supreme Court.
If the extreme views are rejected, what is left is neither simple
nor easy. This middle-ground view would suggest that the
Constitution can be read and interpreted in non-arbitrary ways
which will make clear that some answers are wrong. Yet, even when
read in this principled way, it will often be true that more than one
answer to a particular question is logically possible.' That is to say,
CONN. L. REv. 849 (1989).

Of course, if such were the case, we could probably abolish the Court and
turn its wholly ministerial duties over to a clerk or, perhaps, to a properly
programmed computer.
"Yet, this would also suggest that the Court should be abolished. Its
judgments could have little or no claim to legitimacy since they would rest on
nothing more than the personal whims of its members. If any body of people is
to be empowered to dictate its personal views, surely, that body should at least be
elected by the people directly.
5 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE and MICHAEL C. DoRF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
33-34 (1991) [hereinafter TRIBE & DORF]. To illustrate this point the authors examine
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977), where a divided Court
concluded that a statute, which identified Richard Nixon by name denying him
access to his White House papers and tapes until such had been fully catalogued
and reviewed by the General Services Administrator, was not a Bill of Attainder.
The majority held that the statute did not in fact punish Nixon and that Richard
Nixon was "a legitimate class of one." Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472. However, the
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choice cannot be ruled out of judicial decision making.6
If choice can be channelled or limited but cannot be ruled
out, how is a judge to choose? The middle-ground position must
argue that the choice is neither wholly predetermined nor wholly
free but rather is influenced by principled methods of analysis which
can be identified. A judicial decision can be evaluated by asking
how well it integrates the relevant analytical factors in arriving at its
result.
The middle-ground position is, in some ways, the hardest one
to defend, because it lacks the simple clarity of the extremes. It
requires that the extreme positions be acknowledged as partly true
without embracing them as complete answers.
In On Reading the Constitution, Laurence Tribe and Michael
Dorf take the middle-ground, building their arguments around the
question of fundamental rights. Issues such as sexual privacy and
abortion require that the Court ask whether the asserted right is
fundamental.9 How should this determination be made? The
dissenting justices found that the statute was a prohibited Bill of Attainder because
it penalized Richard Nixon by imposing a stigmatizing disability and explicitly
identified the individual so penalized. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 536-45 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
6 See Laurence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generalityin the Definition
of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057, 1061 (1990) [hereinafter Levels of Generality]. The
authors focus on the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a criminal defendant's right
to a speedy trial. Because the text of the Sixth Amendment does not qualify
"speedy" with a particular length of time, if a criminal defendant claimed his right
to a speedy trial was violated, the court would have to make a choice as to what
length of time constituted "speedy." In such a case choice could not be ruled out
of judicial decision making.
' "Proceeding from the premise that there is a real dispute over ways of
interpreting the Constitution, we shall try to understand what the structure of that
dispute is." TRIBE & DoRF, supra note 5, at 4.
' "When a judge writes about the 'central value' of this or that clause of the
Constitution, as Judge Bork did in the Oilman case, he suggests that there is a
middle ground between the literal text of the Constitution and the purely subjective
realm of the judge's own values." Id. at 69 (citing Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970,
995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985)).
9
[With respect to] substantive due process.., the designation of
a right as fundamental requires that the State offer a compelling
justification for limitations of that right. In addition, under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, statesanctioned inequalities that bear upon the exercise of a
fundamental right will be upheld only if they serve a compelling
governmental interest.
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authors realize that the way a right is described will often be
outcome determinative. 10 Thus, the question becomes how to
decide "at what level of generality should the right previously
protected, and the right currently claimed, be described?"" This
question becomes the ultimate focus of the book.
Interestingly, the authors' argument is strongest when
demonstrating that Justice Scalia's proposed method for evaluating
fundamental rights claims is fatally flawed. Justice Scalia claims that
his method eliminates the "levels of generality" problem. 2 The
authors closely examine Scalia's proposal and demonstrate that it is
essentially incoherent."
Tribe and Dorf are less convincing when presenting their own
method for determining fundamental rights claims. 4
In
constructing a framework for interpreting the Constitution, they
convincingly demonstrate that the two extreme positions delineated
Levels of Generality, supra note 6, at 1057 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 500-06 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1975) (substantive due process); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (equal protection)).
1oSee, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). This case involved the
constitutionality of a Georgia statute which criminalized sodomy. The majority
opinion, delivered by Justice White, declared the issue presented was, "whether the
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy . . . ." Id. at 190. The majority concluded that there was no such
fundamental right. In contrast, the dissent, written by Justice Blackmun, stated,
"this case is about 'the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let alone."' Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted). The dissent, after framing the issue in terms of an
individual's right to privacy, concluded that, "before Georgia can prosecute its
citizens for making choices about the most intimate aspects of their lives, it must
do more than assert that the choice they have made is an 'abominable crime not fit
to be named among Christians."' Id. at 199-200 (citations omitted).
As to the opinions in Bowers the authors state, "[slince the majority and
the dissent ask different questions, it is not surprising that they give different
answers." TRIBE & DORF, supra note 5, at 74.
nTRIBE & DORF, supra note 5, at 73.
12See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). Justice Scalia
justified his method of analyzing fundamental rights claims by asserting that this
method would limit judicial discretion. Id. at 128 n.6. The method proposed by
Scalia is to find "the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified." Id.
13See TRIBE & DoRF, supra note 5, at ch. 3, 5.
' This should not be surprising. As the authors themselves note, "it is easier
to destroy than to create, easier to deconstruct than to construct .... ." Id. at 4.
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above are unacceptable, yet some looseness in their presentations
could lead some less experienced readers to conclude that one of the
extreme positions is correct after all."5
Chapter One argues convincingly that no single ideological
prism can provide all answers to constitutional questions. The
authors' particular target is the theory of original intent.
TUbke and
Dorf agree that history informs the meaning of constitutional
language, but reject the notion that history alone is sufficient to
answer constitutional questions.16 They remind us that "only the
text itself is law."' 7 The "text itself seems to preclude an interpretive
method that relies too heavily upon history alone."' 8 Not only did
the framers (who surely must include not only those who wrote the
Constitution in secret, but those who debated and ratified it publicly
in a series of ratifying conventions) 9 sometimes disagree about the
'5 It is not entirely clear to which audience this book was aimed. In one sense,
it might be argued that the book is a letter written to Justice Scalia and others on
the Court who might be influenced by his views. More generally, it could be
argued that the book is intended for a small group of legal scholars already
committed to the middle ground position but likely to be tempted into adopting
Justice Scalia's analytical methodology. Yet, in their introduction, Tribe and Dorf
stress that the debate about proper methods of constitutional interpretation has
entered the public consciousness generally. That, and the tone created by the use
of plain English, suggest that the authors had a more general audience in mind.
Certainly, two distinguished academics, whose words were chosen by the publisher
for inclusion on the book's jacket, believe that the book is particularly useful for
general audiences. Dean Geoffrey Stone, of the University of Chicago Law School,
suggests that the book is "filled with insight, particularly for a nonexpert audience,"
while Dean Jesse Choper, of the University of California Law School, notes that the
book "should be understandable to non-lawyers as well as lawyers." The authors,
of course, are not to be held responsible either for the book's jacket or the words
of others.
16
Surely close attention to history will prevent us from deploying
the Constitution as a kind of crystal ball in which we might see
whatever we wish to see. Yet however helpful history may
be-and although it is indefensible to ignore it-history alone
cannot serve to domesticate, discipline, and bind down text.
TRIBE & DORF, supra note 5, at 18.
17 Id. at 11.
18 Id.

When one considers the various amendments, the group of framers grows
still larger. Not only should those in Congress and state legislatures or ratifying
conventions involved with a particular amendment be considered when
interpreting the particular amendment, but so too must be considered the intended
effect of one amendment on the rest of the Constitution.
19
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meaning of some of its provisions," but the language used at many
key points was both general and value-laden,' making it reasonable
to believe that the framers "intended"the particular application of the
principles to change over time while the principles themselves
remained static.'
For example, the change from legislative to direct popular election of
United States Senators had the effect of eliminating the voice of state governments
(as opposed to the people at large from a state) from the national legislative body.
Did this change stand alone or did it work a fundamental change in the structure
of our government generally? To what degree should the amendment's framers'
views on this question control? To what degree should the Constitution's framers'
views on matters affected by such an amendment (and of which they could have
no knowledge at the time the unamended Constitution was adopted) control? The
attempt to find and apply the intent of the framers becomes increasingly difficult,
if not impossible, unless the definition of framers is arbitrarily limited in ways
arguably not consistent with the history of the creation, ratification, and
amendment of the Constitution.
0For example, the authors reference the changing views of some of the
framers, naming Thomas Jefferson in particular, concerning the constitutionality of
disqualifying clergy from elective office. TRIBE & DORF, supra note 5, at 12.
2 The authors quote with approval Justice White's dissent in Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). "[The
Constitution] is a document announcing fundamental principles in value-laden
terms that leave ample scope for the exercise of normative judgments by those
charged with interpreting and applying it." Id. at 789.
"Thus, the authors argue, it is permissible to conclude that segregated public
schools would violate the Equal Protection Clause today even though the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment would not have taken this view at the time:
It is not that the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment had
changed. From its enactment the Equal Protection Clause was
understood to render unconstitutional the subjugation of an
entire race with the force of law. It took us longer than it should
have to concede that segregating people in the public schools
amounted to subjugating an entire race by force of law. But the
basic principle remained constant. It is quite likely that many of
the original Framers and those responsible for enacting
subsequent amendments, although perhaps not all, would have
been rightfully horrified at Wills's prescription of amnesia [that
in interpreting the Constitution we should "forget" everything
since the ratification] as part of the proper method of applying
their words to a changing reality.
TRIBE & DORF, supra note 5, at 13 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). The
"Wills" mentioned is Gary Wills and the reference is to his book, INVENTING
AMERIcA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1978).
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The authors also warn against "two interpretive fallacies,"'

first, the view that particular parts of the Constitution can be read in
isolation from the rest of the document (dis-integration)24 and
second, that the Constitution as a whole embodies but one
overreaching theme or vision which should be impressed upon the
language to answer all constitutional questions (hyper-integration).
The warning is both timely and important. Attempts to make
the Constitution the servant of any particular social ideology require
one to give up the process of rational analysis and become, instead,
a true believer. Attempts to isolate pieces of the Constitution require
that other parts be ignored. Either of these approaches would
undermine the authors' basic premise that reasoned constitutional
analysis is possible.
In Chapter Two, the authors buttress their argument that
judging is more than legislating personal value choices by reminding
the reader of cases in which Justices have voted contrary to their
reputed political leanings and even their personal predilections. The
examples are well chosen, including Justice Kennedy's anguished
concurrence in Texas v. Johnson, the case which upheld burning the
American flag as protected free expression.2'
It should also be noted, however, that the book is full of
examples in which judges who advocate a particular method of
TRIBE

& DORF, supra note 5, at 19.

2 One example the authors use to illustrate the problem of dis-integration is
that, if taken in isolation, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, with its underlying ideal of equality, could be interpreted as requiring
socialism. However, such a conclusion ignores the existence of other provisions,
such as the Fifth Amendment which states in part, "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation," which protects the capitalist
institution of private ownership of property. Id. at 22.
' "Itseems to have become a professional habit of constitutional commentators
to superimpose their own preferred vision of what the Constitution is 'really'
meant to do, and then to sweep aside all aspects of its text, history, and structure
that do not quite fit the preferred grand design." Id. at 25. The authors here refer
to Richard Epstein's TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DoMAIN (1985), in which Epstein poses the argument that the entire Constitution
is to protect private property, as an example of such hyper-integration. TRIBE &
DORF, supra note 5, at 28.
2 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). "I join [Justice Brennan's]
opinion without reservation, but with a keen sense that this case, like others before
us from time to time, exacts its personal toll ....The hard fact is that sometimes
we must make decisions we do not like." Id.
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interpretation fail to apply it.27 One obvious explanation for this
phenomenon is that sometimes judges do follow personal moral or
political beliefs at the expense of non-partisan analysis. The authors
acknowledge this but appear to believe that the instances of such are
not a central factor in judicial decision making.'
Additional
discussion and support for this view, beyond the examples given,
would have been welcome.
Tribe and Dorf present lessons or rules for undertaking the
task of understanding constitutional analysis. They articulate
approaches, including a cautious "common-law method of case-by'
case-formulation,"29
which avoids the two fallacies identified
earlier.' These approaches work with the text to "channel[] choice
17See, e.g., TRIBE & DORF, supra note 5, at 15-16 (discussion of Judge Posner).
Instances are also cited in which one or another Justice falls so easily into reliance
on one of the two great fallacies that it would make any reader wonder whether
similar result-oriented decision making was at work. See, e.g., id. at 21 (discussion
of Justice Burger). The authors also say, "That the Court has occasionally rewritten
the Constitution, however, doesn't make such a practice right." Id. at 41. In this
context, however, the point is only that the Court has done and still does this and
that the authors bear the burden of explaining why and how pervasive they believe
the practice to be.
"Although it is certainly the case that no Justice is without such tendencies,
the range of cases that arise under the Constitution, and the judgments for which
they call, defy any such simple hyper-integrated classification." Id. at 34.
2 Id. at 63.
' After analyzing Supreme Court cases which have interpreted the Republican
Form Clause (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4) the authors conclude:
From this example we can draw four lessons about reading the
Constitution: (1) relying on an amendment written so that it
cannot plausibly be made to apply won't do; and (2) relying on
an overall, unstructured system of tacit postulates is too loose;
but (3) searching the Constitution for other applicable texts is
always an available option, so long as we are careful (4) to
require that the text upon which we settle is able to support the
weight that we would make it bear.
TRIBE & DORF, supra note 5, at 45. "[Ilt is no more legitimate to subtract something
from the Constitution because it is out of phase with your vision of the overall plan
than it is to add something that you wish it contained." Id. at 53 (emphasis in
original).
Of particular interest in this regard is the discussion of the Ninth
Amendment. The authors correctly argue that a judge is not free to ignore the
Amendment, and further that the Ninth Amendment does not itself create rights.
It is, rather, an explicit rule of constitutional interpretation and as such has an
important role to play. Specifically, the Ninth Amendment prohibits one from
proving certain rights do not exist simply because they are not enumerated in the
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without eliminating it."" That is a crucial point. "[T]here exists no
formula that could eliminate altogether the need for judicial choice,
although there are certainly formulas that try to hide that need
behind proclamations of 'original intent' or of the 'clear meaning' of
the text."'32
Contrary to those who argue that unless choice can be
eliminated from judicial decision making the process itself becomes
merely judicial legislating, the authors stand for the proposition that
"[t]he existence of room for disagreement.., is not proof that what
is going on does not deserve to be called interpretation .... ."'
If choice cannot be eliminated but interpretation rather than
legislation is going on, there must be a non-personal, non-whimsical,
non-political basis on which choice should be exercised. Part of the
success or failure of the book will be the reader's judgment about
whether the authors ultimately manage to articulate such a basis.
The testing ground, addressed in Chapters Three and Five, is the
question of whether an asserted right is, or is not, fundamental.
Chapter Three focuses on what the authors identify as
"perhaps the central substantive question of modem constitutional
law":' how to decide whether an asserted right is to be deemed
fundamental, and as such, to be entitled to the strict scrutiny
standard of review?" They suggest that the question will be
answered on the basis of how the right asserted is described, and
how that description compares with other rights previously deemed
to be fundamental.36 The more general the description, the more
likely the right is to be seen as fundamental. 7 Thus, a right to
text of the Constitution. Id. at 54.
Id. at 33 (emphasis omitted).
32 Id. (emphasis in original).
33Id. at 37.

at 73.
a The strict scrutiny standard, which applies in cases involving substantive due
process or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that
the State offer compelling justification for any limitation on the right asserted. See,
e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (equal protection); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (substantive due process).
' TRIBE & DORF,supra note 5, at 73.
3'The case of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), is an excellent
illustration of this point. The case involved the constitutionality of a Georgia state
statute criminalizing an act of sodomy between consenting adults. The majority
opinion, delivered by Justice White, described the asserted right as, "the right to
engage in homosexual sodomy." Id. at 190. The majority found such a right was
3Id.
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personal liberty and bodily integrity is more likely to be recognized
than a right to ingest cocaine.
For those who have decided that law is nothing more than
politics, and that judging is nothing more than an exercise of the
personal will to power, there is an easy and cynical answer. The
right should be described in such manner as will lead to the result
the judge has already decided to reach. For those who believe a
singular value-free technique can be used to answer all questions, the
answer is also easy.3
For those, however, who believe that while value choices
cannot be eliminated from judging, judging is still more than the
imposition of personal value choices, the question is critical. As
restated by the authors, the question becomes, "at what level of
generality should the right previously protected, and the right
currently claimed, be described?"39
Justice Scalia claims to have found the non-arbitrary valuefree answer to this question.' It happens to be an answer which is
unlikely to find any unenumerated right to be fundamental. It
would not be unfair to say that a major aim of Chapters Three and
Five is to refute Scalia's claim.
Bowers v. Hardwick41 provides the authors with an excellent
example of the levels of generality problem. Whether, consistent
with the Constitution, the State has the power to criminalize an act
of sodomy between consenting adults in the home may depend upon
how the right is described, and how it is understood to be situated
within the panoply of rights already recognized by the Court.
Unreasonable descriptions must be ruled out. An example of
such a description would be one which is so narrow as to be
not fundamental. However, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun, finding the
asserted right to be fundamental, described the right as "the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized man, namely, the right to be let
alone." Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See TRIBE & DORF,
supra note 5, at 74.
Many have claimed that the theory of original intent is a value-free technique.
See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, OriginalIntent, and Economic Rights, 23
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 823 (1986); Edwin Meese III,
Construing the Constitution,19 U.C.
DAVIS L.REV. 22 (1985).
3 TRIBE & DORF, supra note 5, at 73.
'0The right should be described at, "the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified."
Id. at 73 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989)).
41478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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disconnected from other rights previously recognized.
Also
unreasonable would be a description which is so broad and generally
stated that it becomes factually disconnected from the case at issue.
Even when such obviously unreasonable descriptions are
ruled out, reasonable alternative formulations of the right will often
be available. How should a judge choose between reasonable
alternative descriptions?
One approach is a process of "interpolation and extrapolation"
which attempts to discover unifying principles which make specific
constitutional guarantees, and the cases interpreting them, coherent
as a group .' The authors criticize the Court when it "has failed to
recognize the relationship between liberties which, upon reflection
seem quite closely linked."' Yet, the authors concede that a search
for unifying principles may often lead to more than one." The
problem of how judges should choose between them is still not
resolved.
This is a crucial question. Once obviously wrong answers are
removed from the picture, is there any principled way to choose
between the remaining logically possible characterizations?
Unfortunately, it must be said that the book continually asks this
question and then slides away from it, leaving the impression that
the answer is really no (although the authors seem to reject this
conclusion).'
4

TRIBE & DORF, supra note 5, at 77.

3Id. at 78.
"Id. at 79.
Chapter Four examines whether the fields of literature or mathematics can
C
illuminate the process of choice in a legal context. This chapter, while interesting
and helpful, should have come before Chapter Three and not after it. Chapters
Three and Five have a unity of focus which Chapter Four disrupts.
Literature assumes "a common human experience of the world." Id. at 83.
Analysis of a literary tale begins with these assumptions and can be judged by how
well the plot is developed within those assumptions. Even here, however, "[w]hat
causes one reader to prefer one ending and another reader to prefer a different
ending is not consistency in the abstract, but aesthetic value judgments of one sort
or another. These value judgments are necessarily external to the text." Id. at 82.
Legal questions about fundamental rights, however, often challenge one set of
common assumptions and propose another. If nothing but the judge's value
judgments, which are external to the constitutional text, guide decision, then those
who argue that judging is an arbitrary exercise of power are correct.
The authors conclude that "[haw is, ultimately, unlike mathematics[,
because] mathematics, by definition, proceeds from assumed unprovable
postulates[, while] legal arguments center around the truth or falsity of the
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Chapter Five takes aim at Justice Scalia's claim that his
analytical method eliminates the problem of selecting the appropriate
level of abstraction when describing an asserted fundamental right.
The authors are successful in demonstrating that Scalia has not found
the answer. Their own summary of their argument says it best:
In this chapter we argue that Justice Scalia's claim is
false on several grounds: first, that the extraction of
fundamental rights from societal traditions is no more
value-neutral than is the extraction of fundamental
rights from legal precedent; second, that there is no
universal metric of specificity against which to
measure an asserted right; and third, that even if
Justice Scalia's program were workable, it would
achieve a semblance of judicial neutrality only at the
unacceptably high cost of near-complete abdication of
the judicial responsibility to protect individual
rights.4'
Historical traditions, the authors argue, are subject to greater
manipulation than legal precedents both because any statement of a
historical tradition is selective and because such traditions often
contain conflicting strands.47 The presence or absence of a history
of legal regulation of an asserted right tells much about politics and
history, but little about constitutionality.4 Majoritarianism does not
equal constitutionality.49 Traditions do not have but one indicia of
preliminary assumptions." Id. at 96 (citation omitted). Techniques by which
*postulate challenging cases are dealt with have very interesting parallels to the
techniques of common law analysis.
4 Id. at 98.
,'Id. at 98-99. To illustrate this point the authors look at the issue presented in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989): whether the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment embodies "a deeply rooted tradition of separation
of church and state, such that religious displays are barred from public property."
TRIBE &DORF, supra note 5, at 99. In looking at historical tradition the authors find
that there are conflicting strands. "Massachusetts provided for local establishments
as late as 1833." Id. (citation omitted). However, "Virginia ...enacted 'An Act for
Establishing Religious Freedom' in 1786, before the United States Constitution was
written." Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, one must still make a choice as to what
strand of tradition should be followed.
Id. at 99-100.
"Id. at 100.
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specificity, and therefore, any attempt to find the "most specific"
requires a value choice about what indicia to use.'
The authors also suggest that Scalia's method is designed to
take the Court out of the business of protecting unenumerated rights.
"[S]uch a curtailment would seem to be the purpose of his
method."' It permits judges to disguise their value choices but it
does not eliminate them. 2 "[TIhis approach was virtually tailormade as a means of overruling Roe v. Wade."'
This is so because, unless the state's interest is absurd
on its face, when it is suitably incorporated into an
asserted liberty it will render that liberty so specific
as to seem insupportable, or at least radically
disconnected from precedent. The privacy right
protected in Roe becomes the implausible "right" to
destroy a living fetus; the free speech right protected
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan becomes the dubious
"right" to libel a public official; the right to an
exclusionary remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations protected in Mapp v. Ohio becomes the
counterintuitive "right" of a criminal to suppress the
so Id. at 101-02. To evidence this point the authors look to Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), where the Court argued that there was no long-standing tradition
making abortion illegal. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129-41. Because there was no specific
tradition regarding abortion, the authors state that one must look to the next most
specific tradition. However, a choice must be made.
Is that next most specific tradition a tradition regarding women's
reproductive freedom in general? Or is it a tradition regarding
the rights of fetuses, as reflected in laws making feticide a crime
when caused by someone other than the mother? If the former,
then the Court would ask if the fundamental right to privacy
includes the right not to reproduce. Since Eisenstadtv. Baird [405
U.S. 438 (1972)] answered that question affirmatively, the Court
might reason from this tradition that there is a fundamental
right to abortion. If the Court chooses the tradition about
feticide as the next most specific tradition, however, then it
would have to hold that there is no fundamental right to
abortion.
TRIBE & DORF, supra note 5, at 102 (citation omitted).
s' Id. at 104.
52 Id. at 106.
Id. at 107 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES

97(1990)).
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truth. To state these cases in this way is to decide
them in the government's favor.'
Essentially, the authors suggest, adoption of Justice Scalia's
method means, in virtually all circumstances, that the government
wins and the individual loses. The authors call this "truly
frightening."05
Either the method will destroy the Court's
individual rights jurisprudence (if used consistently) or, if used
selectively, it becomes a tool allowing a judge to impose his or her
own values while pretending not to do so.'
Having effectively destroyed Scalia's attempt to remove
judicial value choice from Constitutional analysis, the authors turn
to their own view. The authors do not believe that value choices can
be ruled out, yet they reject the notion that such choice is purely
arbitrary. It should be clear by now that the authors suggest
techniques for judging rather than any one simple answer, and that
they rely on a continual process of applying the techniques to
specific cases over time to keep judges honest and to weed out
mistakes. Their approach does not guarantee that each case will be
decided correctly but does suggest that, over time, error will be
identified.
First, every technique noted throughout this review is
relevant. This includes the search for "consistency with the
assumptions underlying the constitutional text"5'7 and the avoidance
of the fallacies of hyper-integration and dis-integration. The rationale
of prior cases (not just the holdings) should be examined to
determine "whether the asserted level of generality provides an
appropriate description of already-protected rights without reference
to the newly-asserted rights."'
"An abstraction that has been
concocted merely for litigational purposes will often be recognizable
as such because it is consistent only with the holdings of prior cases,
not with their rationales."' 9
& DORF, supra note 5, at 107 (citations omitted).
s Id. at 108.
5' Id. at 109. "The anti-generalizing approach exemplified by footnote 6 [of
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989),] is perhaps best described as
a form of judicial nihilism. It denies that there are essential aspects to prior cases."
TRIBE & DORF, supra note 5, at 112 (emphasis in original).
5'

TRIBE

"'
5

Id.
Id.

at 111.

" Id. at 111-12.
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Thus, the methods of the common law channel choice
without eliminating it, but also provide judges with guides by which
to critique their choices. "If this method [of generalizing rights] is
not rational, then neither is the common law."'' Thus, the authors
offer no infallible means by which right answers can be derived;
however, they do suggest that it is possible to read the Constitution
in principled rather than result-oriented ways.
The central premise, that constitutional analysis cannot be
reduced either to an exact science ruling out all judicial value
choices, or to an exercise of unconstrained personal political power,
is very important. It is also increasingly under attack, as the book
points out. For this reason, it is essential, especially for the
nonexpert reader who has perhaps been wooed by adherents of one
of the extreme positions, that the authors speak about these matters
clearly and avoid giving even unintentional aid and comfort to the
enemy.
Unfortunately, the authors occasionally do exactly that. For
example, in a discussion of dis-integration, they correctly point out
that merely because the Fifth Amendment appears to contemplate
that one can be deprived of life with due process of law (at least by
negative implication), a complete discussion of the constitutionality
of the death penalty must also take into account the Eighth
Amendment which prohibits not specific punishments, but those
deemed cruel and unusual. It might be that this general formulation
contemplates the notion that what is cruel and unusual will change
in definition over time.
The authors want to nail down the point by noting that the
language of the Double Jeopardy clause appears to contemplate that
punishment might include the loss of a limb.61 They want us to
agree that the language of that clause would not preclude a finding
under the Eighth Amendment that such constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. So far, so good. But the authors actually go
further, claiming that capital punishment would violate that
Amendment, a claim which is unnecessary to the argument and
serves to detract from it. Worse, they say, "no one would seriously
argue today that bodily mutilation, employed on occasion as a
punishment during colonial times, could withstand scrutiny under
60Id. at

115 (quoting Charles Black, On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment,
in BLACK, THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 194 (1986)).
61"[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
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the Eighth Amendment. 62
If the authors mean no more than that the present Court
would be unlikely to be receptive this argument, I agree, although
the point is not relevant to their argument. If they mean that they
would oppose the argument or that most of us in the legal academic
community would, I agree. But is it true that no one would argue
this? Not Christian fundamentalists who take the Biblical injunction
"an eye for an eye"' literally? We know that some countries whose
4
criminal law is based on 'the Koran cut off the hands of thieves.6
Would such a proposal have no support from any Muslims in our
country? On some of the famous talk-shows of the day I have heard
it seriously proposed that castration is the proper punishment for the
crime of rape.'
Personally I find such proposals horrendous. My point is
that in trying to prove too much, the authors undermine their own
credibility. They make it appear that what is constitutional depends
only on what the majority (or a super majority) or "everybody"
believes. The weakest aspect of Tribe & Dorf's argument here is that
since their assertion that nobody would argue this point appears to
be wrong, the argument makes it appear that the authors' own
personal view of what is reasonable has also become their measure of
what is constitutional.'
This contradicts the authors' point that
judicial decision making is more than the legislation of personal
value choices.
In Chapter Two, one of the authors' four rules for reading the
Constitution states, "searching the Constitution for other applicable
texts is always an available option so long as we are careful."'67 Who
is this "we"? Does it mean the technique is acceptable as long as the
authors' views on the "reasonable" limits of such a search are kept?
62TRIBE & DORF, supra note 5, at 21.
Exodus 21:24.
Ian Buruma, A Nation Divided, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1989, § 6, at 27.
S.C. Anderson, Rapist is Waving Second Thoughts on Choosing Castration, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1983, at 35.
"At one point, the authors argue that "the background assumptions of the late
eighteenth century provide a plausible basis for affirming the Supreme Court's
privacy decisions from the 1920s through 1977, and for concluding that those
decisions are right and that Hardwick is wrong." Id. at 60 (emphasis in original).
Would the "background assumptions of the late eighteenth century" also provide
a plausible basis for concluding that the Eighth Amendment is not violated by the
hacking off of limbs and that the authors are wrong?
67 TRIBE & DORF, supra note 5, at 45 (emphasis added).
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What does it mean to be "careful"? Such language conveys a
disheartening feeling that what the authors mean is that other
constitutional analysts should refrain from arguments which the
authors believe are not reasonable. This sort of sloppiness will push
some to conclude that, whatever the authors say, what they really
advocate is their personal vision of the Good and the Just.
Also in Chapter Two, Tribe & Dorf explore the question of
unenumerated rights in the context of a hypothetical law requiring
families to eat at home together and to begin the meal with a
moment of silence once each month.' The authors argue that the
Constitution can be said to protect freedoms associated with family
life because "there is a series of decisions under the Fourteenth
Amendment, stretching back to the 1920s, recognizing a realm of
' Yet, the authors had previously quoted
autonomy for the family."69
with approval Justice O'Connor's view that "no one acquires a vested
or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even
when that span of time covers our entire national existence .... 70
Can the authors have it both ways? If long usage in violation of a
right cannot legitimize it, then long usage in recognizing a right
cannot create it if it never actually existed.
Similarly, at one point the authors reference with apparent
approval "Justice Harlan's point ... that the freedom of speech, the

freedom of religion, and so forth make sense only if connected by a
broader and underlying principle of freedom of thought and
conscience."' Earlier in the book, the authors also appear to
approve of the position taken by Justice Holmes in his dissent in
Lochner v. New York,' that the "Constitution is not intended to
embody a particular economic theory."'
Could not a Lochner
supporter argue that many of the provisions of the Constitution
make sense only if "connected by a broad and underlying principle
'
"of capitalism and pre-governmental property rights? 74
The
authors should make it clear why the application of one such
at 45.
at 49.
70 Id. at 47 (citation omitted) (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 630 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
6' Id.
69Id.

7 TRIBE & DORF, supra note 5, at 77 (referring to Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)).
72 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
73 1d.
7' TRIBE & DORF, supra note 5, at 77.
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principle is reasonable while the other is not.
In Chapter Four the authors discuss the "common human
experience of the world"'75 coupled with the individual reader's
aesthetic values7 6 which underlie literary textual analysis. The
authors acknowledge that similar "unspoken assumptions... give
meaning to the constitutional text."" The authors flatly state that
"the need to resort to extra-constitutional values is not confined to
the question of what the Constitution is, but pervades the question
of what the Constitution means."'7
Perhaps because the authors discuss Bowers v. HardwickP9 so
extensively in their book, this reader was immediately reminded of
Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in that case, which based
rejection of the inclusion of consensual sodomy within the ambit of
the right to privacy on the basis of just such values, specifically, its
condemnation by the Judeo-Christian tradition.'
Because the
authors (and this reader) are sharply critical of the outcome in that
case, I would have expected some discussion of why Burger's
approach was not an appropriate use of extra-constitutional values.
Instead, we are told that "what is arbitrary and what is salient is
itself a cultural matter.""1 With this statement, the authors appear
to say that matters of fundamental rights are nothing but cultural
relativism, which seems to be Burger's point, too.
Finally, it should be noted that for those who are still
questioning whether law is more than personal politics, it is no solid
foundation upon which to build that "law must proceed from the
assumption that judges can tell the difference between the essential
and the trivial in reading and applying prior decisions. Otherwise,
there would be no such thing as precedent, and indeed no such thing
as law."' 2 This will convince only those already committed to the
middle ground position, and will not help to answer the doubts of
skeptics. The quoted statement may be particularly unconvincing in
light of the other comment, quoted above, that these determinations
s Id. at 83.
76 Id. at 82.
77

Id. at 83.

Id. at 84 (emphasis in original).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
8o"Condemnation of [homosexual sodomy] is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian
moral and ethical standards." Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
81TRIBE & DoRF, supra note 5, at 87.
82 Id. at 114.
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are based on [the dominant?] culture.' A book which so many
non-expert readers will explore should address these concerns.
These criticisms perhaps dwell at too much length on minor
inconsistencies. The authors do not claim that their work is either
comprehensive or their final word on the subject. Yet, apparent
unexplained contradictions troubled this reviewer and are likely to
trouble others. What is most disturbing is that they did not appear
to trouble the authors. It may be that they are not contradictions at
all, in which case some additional explanations to clarify the points
would have been helpful.
In summary, this is an interesting book which is at its best
when challenging the views of others, either the specific view of
Justice Scalia in relation to the definition of fundamental rights, or
the more general views that judicial decision making is either
confined by a particular ideological perspective or a totally
unconfined exercise of personal legislating based on individual
political perspectives. The book is less effective when putting forth
the authors' own view about how claims that a right is fundamental
can be judged. Occasional linguistic lapses serve somewhat to
undermine their position, particularly among non-expert readers.
Tribe and Dorf modestly claim that their purpose is no more than "to
contribute to a useful dialogue on reading the Constitution
In this they are very successful.
3 Id. at 87.
" Id. at 31. "The dialogue will continue, for we make no claim to have found
a constitutional conversation-stopper." Id. at 64.

